The Extrinsic Value of Academic Philosophy in School

This essay explores the extrinsic value of academic philosophy in schools, drawing on insights from Jane Gatley’s article, ‘Philosophy for Children and the Extrinsic Value of Academic Philosophy’, published in Metaphilosophy (2020). Gatley’s work examines the increasing demand for philosophy departments to demonstrate their social impact and relevance, particularly in the context of public funding and educational policy. By investigating the relationship between Philosophy for Children (P4C) and academic philosophy, the essay discusses the complexities and limitations of extending claims about the value of P4C to academic philosophy more broadly. The discussion that follows is grounded in the arguments and evidence presented in Gatley’s article, aiming to provide a critical perspective on the extrinsic benefits that philosophy can offer to individuals and society when introduced within the school environment.

Academic philosophy in schools has increasingly been called upon to demonstrate its relevance and public value, a pressure particularly acute in contexts such as the United Kingdom, where frameworks like the Research Excellence Framework (REF) and the forthcoming Knowledge Excellence Framework (KEF) explicitly tie funding to demonstrable societal impact. In this climate, philosophy departments often look to the well-established literature and advocacy around Philosophy for Children (P4C) to justify their existence and funding. The apparent extrinsic benefits of P4C—ranging from improved reasoning skills to enhanced civic engagement—are tempting models for universities aiming to show their impact beyond the academy. However, a careful analysis of the relationship between P4C and academic philosophy reveals that claims about the extrinsic value of the former cannot be straightforwardly transferred to the latter.

The concept of extrinsic value refers to the utility of philosophy in producing desirable personal and social goods. These include enhanced well-being, better decision-making, improved communication, increased social cohesion, and stronger democratic engagement. In policy circles, the argument that academic philosophy yields such benefits underpins calls for its continued public funding. Yet, as the article demonstrates, the mechanisms by which P4C and academic philosophy might produce these goods are far from identical, and their relative effectiveness is shaped by their differing pedagogical approaches and institutional goals.

P4C, inspired by the work of Matthew Lipman and Deweyan educational principles, is typically characterised by its commitment to open-ended, student-driven dialogue within a Community of Inquiry (CoI). This model is predominantly non-directive, with facilitators guiding the process but not dictating content or outcomes. In the United Kingdom, the SAPERE model and similar approaches have become dominant, focusing on developing critical, creative, and caring thinking through philosophical questioning and group discussion. Empirical studies—such as those carried out by the Educational Endowment Foundation—provide strong evidence for the cognitive and non-cognitive benefits of P4C, including gains in literacy, numeracy, confidence, and social skills.

The success and visibility of P4C have made it attractive for academic philosophy departments keen to demonstrate societal impact. Many departments now incorporate P4C modules and public engagement projects, affiliating themselves with established P4C organisations. This has allowed universities to showcase philosophy’s extrinsic value, responding to external metrics and policy incentives. Nevertheless, the article cautions against the uncritical adoption of P4C as a proxy for the broader extrinsic value of philosophy. It points out that the non-directive, dialogical nature of P4C may not be suitable for all philosophical aims, particularly where the communication of complex or controversial research is concerned.

For example, research into implicit bias and stereotype threat—fields with significant moral and social implications—may require directive teaching methods to ensure that crucial insights are effectively communicated. The CoI structure of P4C, being non-directive, may not naturally lead participants to recognise or accept the existence of implicit bias, given its unconscious nature and the tendency for such biases to remain hidden even from those who hold them. Similarly, certain moral issues, such as the dangers of eugenics, may warrant a more assertive pedagogical approach to avoid the risk of students reaching ethically problematic conclusions through open-ended discussion alone.

Furthermore, the article raises the possibility that many of the documented benefits of P4C—such as improved communication and collaboration—may not be unique to philosophy as a discipline, but rather stem from the dialogical methods at the heart of the P4C model. Evidence suggests that structured dialogue and student participation, regardless of subject matter, can improve learning outcomes and social skills. If this is the case, then the distinctive extrinsic value of academic philosophy becomes harder to delineate. Dialogue and inquiry can be cultivated through many disciplines and activities; the challenge for philosophy departments is to articulate what, if anything, is unique about philosophical dialogue and content in generating these goods.

This line of argument leads to a further complication: while P4C may be a powerful model for producing extrinsic goods, it is not clear that the same outcomes can be expected from other, more traditional forms of academic philosophy, such as lectures, seminars, or public talks, which may be more directive or content-focused and less dialogical. The empirical research into the extrinsic value of these non-P4C models is limited, and much of the advocacy for philosophy’s societal benefits relies on evidence that is, strictly speaking, evidence for the value of P4C rather than philosophy per se.

The article concludes that philosophy departments should be cautious in using P4C as their default model for public engagement and impact. While P4C can have considerable extrinsic value, there is a risk of overlooking or even precluding other valuable modes of philosophical engagement if it becomes the sole paradigm. Departments are encouraged to experiment with a variety of models and to invest in research that clarifies which aspects of philosophical practice produce which kinds of extrinsic value, and under what conditions.

In summary, the extrinsic value of academic philosophy in schools is a nuanced and unsettled question. While P4C provides a compelling and empirically validated model for producing certain educational and social goods, its distinctive features mean that its benefits cannot automatically be ascribed to academic philosophy in general. As universities continue to seek public legitimacy and funding, a more differentiated and critical approach is required—one that recognises the diversity of philosophical practice and the need for targeted evidence about what philosophy, uniquely, can contribute to individuals and society.

References

Gatley, J. (2020) ‘Philosophy for Children and the Extrinsic Value of Academic Philosophy’, Metaphilosophy, [online] Available at: https://doi.org/10.1111/meta.12445 (First published 21 July 2020).